An great piece of journalism from Richard Behar here. It helps explain the 'push' factors driving Chinese investment in Zambia - a real gap in the dominant literature on the subject. For me it raises an interesting question - whether the image of 'state-led' investment is quite right, or whether the dynamic is more about Chinese individuals, and individual firms, making their way to Zambia and enjoying some financial support from the Chinese state, and possibly, political and economic protection from Chinese diplomats / the Zambian state. I've pulled out one juicy quote:
"most of the value of Zambian copper is unlocked only after it reaches China. Zambian politicians have dreamed for years about using their copper to create a light-industrial sector before they run out of the mineral -- most of which is likely to be gone by 2025 -- but there's still no coherent strategy to make it happen. Meanwhile, Chinese entrepreneurs are using fat bank accounts, vast credit supply, and, in some cases, government-funded incentives to buy up exploration and mining rights, just as they have with timber licenses and concessions in Mozambique. As a result, Zambia and, more particularly, ordinary Zambians are seeing very little benefit. While copper prices have quintupled since 2001, more than 70% of locals still live below the poverty line."
I am not sure about a couple of facts in the article (I don't think there were any fatalities in the shooting at Chambishi, and I don't think copper will runout in 2025), but the basic argument is very interesting.
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